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CHICKASAW NATION V. UNITED STATES AND THE
POTENTIAL DEMISE OF THE INDIAN CANON OF
CONSTRUCTION
George Jackson I1'

Introduction
On November 27, 2001, the Supreme Court decided Chickasaw Nation v.
United States,' ruling that §§ 4401(a)(1) and 4411 of the Internal Revenue
Service Code of 1986 (I.R.C. or the Code) applied to pull-tab gaming
activities conducted on tribal land The Court heard this case on a writ of
certiorari from the Tenth Circuit, which in April 2000, also ruled that I.R.C.
§§ 4401(a)(1) and 4411 apply to the pull-tab gaming activities of the
Chickasaw Nation (the Nation).3 The Court granted the Nation's petition for
certiorari after the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a ruling in
Little Six, Inc. v. UnitedStates,' exempting the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux
(Dakota) Community of Minnesota from paying federal excise and
occupational taxes on their pull-tab games operation. These two decisions
immediately brought to the forefront an issue that was an area of uncertainty
in Federal Indian law since the 1982 passage of the Indian Tribal
Governmental Tax Status Act.'

* Mr. Jackson is currently an associate in the tax department of Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C.

in Washington, D.C. He received his J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law in
May of 2002, his M.S. in Accounting from the University of Virginia Mclntire School of
Commerce in May of2001, and his B.A. in Political Science and Accounting from Westminster
College in May of 1999. Mr. Jackson is a member of the Cherokee Nation.
The author would like to thank Richard Merrill ofthe University of Virginia School of Law
and Mark T. Baker, J.D., for their comments on early drafts of this paper. The author would
also like to thank David Mullon, J.D., former General Counsel of the Cherokee Nation, for his
suggestion of the paper topic. All errors, omissions, and conclusions are strictly those of the
author.
1. 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
2. I.R.C. § 4401(a)(1) (2000) (concerning the application of the federal wagering tax);
I.R.C. § 4411 (2000) (concerning the application of the federal occupational tax).
3. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 2000).
4. 210 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
5. I.R.C. § 7871 (2000); see Scott A. Taylor, An Introductionand Overview of Taxation
and Indian Gaming, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 251, 257 (1997).
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Since the Court heard the case on October 2, 2001, approximately 185
Indian tribes conducting gaming operations in the United States6 anxiously
awaited the Supreme Court's ruling because they knew that it could
potentially cost their $10-billion-dollar-per-year industry7 over $25 million
annually.' The Court's ruling for the government will cost the Chickasaw
Tribe itself $44,721.53 in unpaid wagering excise taxes and interest for the
period from August 1991 through August 1994, in addition to more than onequarter of one percent of their gross revenue generated from pull-tab gaming
activities from August 1994 into the future.9 More importantly, the
Chickasaw and other tribes are concerned that this ruling indicates the Court's
abandonment of the Indian canon of construction, which requires that
ambiguous statutes and treaties be interpreted in favor of the Indians." The
death of this canon would be the most hurtful upshot of what Judge William
Canby, Jr., has termed the Indians' recent "string of losses at the Supreme
Court level."" Many tribes believe that it could open the door to additional
federal regulation of tribes and lead to a further increase of federal taxes on
Indian gaming revenue, a source of tribal income, which has remained largely
untouched by federal income tax provisions, and other taxes imposed by the
Internal Revenue Service. 2
This article argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Chickasaw Nation
applying the federal wagering excise tax and federal occupational tax to
Indian gaming operations was incorrect for two reasons. First, the Court
misinterpreted the language of the statute, and more importantly, the Court
failed to properly apply the 200-year-old Indian canon of construction
requiring ambiguous treaty and statute provisions to be interpreted in favor of
the Indians. Part I briefly outlines the history of Indian Law in the United

6. National Indian Gaming Commission, at <http://www.nigc.gov/nigc/nigcControl?
option=GAMINGTRIBES&REGION 10= 0&SORT=I > (last visited Mar. 5,2003) [hereinafter
NIGC].
7. David W. Chen& Charlie LeDuff, BadBlood in Battle over Casinos, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
28, 2002, at A21.
8. Twenty-five percent of$ 10,000,000,000 under I.R.C. § 440 1(a) (2000), plus $50 under
I.R.C. § 4411 (b) (2000).
9. Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 874 (emphasis added).
10. The Indian canon of construction was most recently used in Little Six, Inc. v. United
States, 210 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
I1. Jeff Hinkle, The US. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, Still a Foothold for Tribal
Sovereignty, AM. INDIAN REP., Oct. 2001, at 8, 9.
12. See Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19. But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-43-066 (Aug. 2, 1990)
(holding the tribe liable for the employer's portion of the FICA tax).
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States and gives an overview of the taxation of Indian tribes and their business
activities. Part II recounts Native American involvement in, and the federal
government's regulation of, tribal gaming operations. Finally, Part III
analyzes the Court's decision in Chickasaw Nation v. United States,'3 by
examining the arguments of both the government and the Tribe, as well as the
circuit court decisions in ChickasawNation v. UnitedStates,'" and Little Six,
Inc. v. United States.15 This article concludes with an assertion that the
Court's decision was erroneous, not only because it incorrectly interpreted the
language of the statute in question, but more importantly, it failed to properly
apply one of the hallmarks of Federal Indian law, the Indian canon of
construction.
I. History of FederalIndian Law
Federal Indian Law occupies a unique place in American legal history. As
one commentator noted, "[t]here are a number of scattering forces that push
Indian law away from any center," creating a body of law without precedent.' 6
Since European settlement first began on the North American continent, there
have been at least two, and most often three, sovereign political entities vying
for power.7
The U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1789, laid the groundwork for Federal
Indian law. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, more commonly known as the
Commerce Clause, vested exclusive authority in Congress to regulate trade
and commerce.'
The Constitution also granted the President, with the
consent ofthe Senate, the power to make treaties with the Indian tribes. 9 Yet,
the Constitution did not solve every question in the emerging field of Indian
law, particularly those ofjurisdiction. However, "[t]his was a far simpler and
clearer declaration of legislative authority over Indian tribes than the
superseded Articles of Confederation contained."2

13. 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
14. 208 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 2000).
15. 210 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
16. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 3 (1987).

17. "Sovereign" is used here to describe the federal government's power as well as that of
the states, U.S. territories, and the Indian tribes. The latter three are, in reality, semi-sovereign
political entities.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
19. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl.2.

20. CASES AND MATERtALSON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 62 (David H. Getches et al. eds., 4th
ed. 1998) [hereinafter GETCHES].
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Following the ratification of the Constitution, most of Indian law was
marked by a series of Trade and Intercourse Acts in which Congress attempted
to further subject all intercourse between Indians and non-Indians to federal
control." In 1823 the Supreme Court decided the first of three cases known
as the Marshall Trilogy. 2 The Trilogy, beginning with Johnsonv. M'Intosh,23
is generally recognized as the most important group of cases in the history of
Federal Indian law, and has served as the legal foundation of most of the
Indian law cases decided by the Court since the 1830s.
A. The Marshall Trilogy
Johnson v. M'Intosh,2 4 involved the validity of a land grant made by an
Indian tribe to non-Indian individuals prior to the passage of the Trade and
Intercourse Acts. In the opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that,
despite the fact that the tribes retained a "title of occupancy"" to their lands,
"complete ultimate title" 26 was vested in the United States. Consequently, the
Court held the transfers invalid based on a doctrine of discovery which gave
the discovering European sovereign a title good against all others, and "the
sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives."2 7 This decision
acknowledged the Indians' legal right in their land, however it recognized that
this right existed at the discretion of the federal government.
The second case of the Trilogy, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,28 involved
attempts by the State of Georgia to extinguish Indian title to all lands within
the State and distribute the land to several Georgia counties. The Court ruled
that the Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign state" despite the fact that it was
"a state, . . . a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of
managing its own affairs and governing itself. '29 Marshall wrote that the
Indian Nations may be more correctly "denominated as domestic dependent
nations," with their relationship to the United States resembling "that of a
21. See Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139;
Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729.
22. Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics
of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 381, 387
(1997).
23. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 592.
26. Id. at 603.
27. Id. at 573.
28. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
29. Id. at 16.
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ward to his guardian." 30 These words, now the touchstone of Federal Indian
law, established the trust relationship between the federal government and the
Indian tribes that remains to this day.
Worcester v. Georgia,3 the third case in the Marshall Trilogy, took the
Court's Cherokee Nation ruling one step further and established the legal
precedent excluding the states from power over Indian affairs. The case
involved the State of Georgia's arrest of non-Indian missionaries residing in
Cherokee territory for not obtaining a license from the State's governor. The
Court ruled that the Trade and Intercourse Acts "manifestly consider the
several Indian nations as distinct and political communities, having territorial
boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive."3 2 This case, along with
the other two cases of the Marshall Trilogy established the "sovereignty" of
the tribes. This sovereignty is a unique sovereignty, that of domestic
dependent nations that "are afforded only limited sovereignty subject to the
'ultimate domain' of the federal government," and is at the root of the
complexity of Federal Indian law.33
B. 18 71-1968
Following Worcester, the United States continued to enter into treaties in
which the tribes gave up their land rights to the federal government to make
way for white settlement.34 In 1871, in an attempt to eradicate Indian tradition
and culture, the United States embarked on a policy of allotment and
assimilation." This policy put an end to the creation of treaties between the'
federal government and the tribes, and started a process of allotting tribal land
to reservation Indians. This resulted in a nearly two-thirds reduction in the
acreage oftribal lands and a corresponding impoverishment of tribal Indians.36
After the federal government realized that allotment was not going to serve
its purpose of completely integrating all Indians into the white American
society, Congress began considering a more protectionist position. In 1934,

30. Id. at 17.
31. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
32. Id. at 557.
33. Rand & Light, supra note 22, at 389.
34. See David H. Getches, A Philosophy ofPermanence: The Indians 'Legacyfor the West,
J.WEST, July 1990, at 54-68.
35. FELIX COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 128 (Rennard Strickland et al.
eds., 1982).
36. WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 20.
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Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act,37 ending allotment and
returning unsold lands to tribal ownership.3S However, this period oftolerance
for the Indian tribes was short-lived, and in 1953 Congress passed a resolution
with the stated intent of ending the status of Indians as "wards of the United
States,"39 and the implied goal of terminating all tribes as political entities.
Again, realizing limited success, Congress began to reconsider its position
of termination. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s brought with it a
more tolerant approach, and perhaps even an appreciation ofNative American
culture. Consequently, in 1968 the United States, led by President Johnson,
ushered in a new period in Federal Indian law: one of self-determination for
the tribes. This new policy, which was carried on by President Nixon, called
for the end of termination and paternalism, and urged Congress to return
control of federal Indian programs to the tribes.4
Just as the Marshall Trilogy's unique definition of sovereignty helped give
birth to a body of law unparalleled in American legal history, Congress's
constantly shifting governmental policy toward the Indians adds to the
complexity of Federal Indian law. This environment has cultivated substantial
litigation, and has left both lawyers and scholars unsure of exactly where
Federal Indian law stands at any point in time.
C. FederalTaxation of Indian Tribes
The oxymoron of "limited sovereignty," and the environment of uncertainty
is nowhere more apparent than in the area of taxation of Indian tribes.4 While
Congress has never passed legislation that explicitly exempts Indian Tribes
from federal income taxation, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has taken

37. Indian Reorganizaton Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
461-479 (2000)).
38. Id. §§ 461-463.
39. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953).
40. Rand & Light, supra note 22, at 392.
41. Tribes have long been recognized to have the power to tax activities that take place on
tribal land. See Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904). However, Tribes are also subject
to at least some forms of federal taxation. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-43-066 (Aug. 2, 1990) (finding
a tribe liable for the employer's portion ofthe FICA tax). But see Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B.
19 (exempting tribes from federal income tax). Tribes are also open to state taxation in some
circumstances. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) (holding that the General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), 25
U.S.C. § 348 (Supp. 1 2001), authorizes the states to tax fee land within a reservation, whether
owned by Indians or non-Indians).
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the position that tribes are generally exempt.42 However, this exemption does
not apply to Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)4 3 or Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)" taxes. In addition, despite Congress's
passage of the Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, tribes may
still be subject to a number of federal excise taxes."
The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act was passed for the purpose
of clarifying federal taxation as it applies to Indian tribes by treating them as
states for certain federal tax purposes.46 It exempts tribes from the special
fuels tax, manufacturers excise tax, communications excise tax, and highway
vehicles tax.47 However, these exemptions only extend to tribal activities
undertaken in furtherance of"an essential governmental function." 8 Whether
the excise tax exemption applies to other tribal activities, such as Indian
gaming, is unclear.49 Professor Scott Taylor, an authority on the taxation of
Indian tribes and Indian gaming, states that "[t]he extensive lottery activity of
states, together with the legal history of gaming, argues strongly in favor of
finding that Indian gaming does involve the exercise of an essential
governmental function, and therefore fits within the exemption of the Indian
Tribal Government Tax Status Act."5 °
II. Indian Gaming andFederalRegulation
Indian gaming operations are the fastest growing segment of the country's

42. Rev. Rul. 94-16. Individual Indians however, have no general exemption from federal
income taxation simply by being an Indian. Lafontaine v. C.I.R., 533 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1976).
43. I.R.C. § 3128 (2000); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-43-066 (Aug. 2, 1990).
44. I.R.C. § 3311 (2000); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-45-037 (Nov. 12, 1993) (finding a tribe liable
for FUTA tax); see also In re Cabazon Indian Casino, 57 B.R. 398 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986);
Washoe Tribes of the State of Nevada & California v. United States, 79-2 T.C.M. (CCH) 9718
(D. Nev. 1979).
45. The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act excise tax exemption extends only to
tribal activities that are undertaken in furtherance of "an essential governmental function."
I.R.C. § 7871(b) (2000).
46. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-984, at 4 (1982).
47. I.R.C. § 7871 (a)(2)(D) (2000).
48. Id. § 787 1(b).
49. I.R.C. § 4401(a) (2000) imposes a wagering tax of one-quarter of one percent on the
amount of all wagers placed on betting pools or lotteries conducted under state law. However,
because tribal lotteries and pull-tabs are not authorized under the laws of a state, but by
Congress, it is unclear whether this tax applies to the tribes' gaming activities. Taylor, supra
note 5, at 257.
50, Id. at 256-57 (emphasis added).
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most rapidly expanding industry (legalized gambling)."' Currently over 185
tribes participate in Indian gaming,52 generating more than $10 billion of
revenue annually.53 Consequently, gaming has undeniably affected the tribes
in many favorable ways, and leads some scholars to believe that the
"economic benefits of Indian gaming arguably have done (at least for the
members of successful gaming tribes) what federal Indian policy could not,
or would not accomplish."54 Gaming helps many tribes obtain a higher level
of economic self-sufficiency by creating jobs and dramatically improving the
standard of living on many reservations.55 It also gives the tribes the financial
resources necessary to fund community improvement projects and increase
their political clout. 6 Perhaps most importantly, the financial success that
gaming brings contributes to a "rising pride and can-doism on reservations."5 7
Notwithstanding the positive effects that Indian gaming has produced, both
for reservation Indians and for non-Indians residing in and around the
reservations," it is not without controversy. The majority of this controversy
is a direct result of the clash of the conflicting political forces which is at the
heart of Indian law. While the tribes as sovereign political entities argue that
they should be able to conduct gaming activities without interference from the
states, the states argue that they should be able to regulate all gaming on the
reservations just as they regulate gaming on nontribal lands within their
respective boundaries.5 9 The states also contend that the special tax status of
Indian tribes and their gaming operations gives them an unfair competitive
advantage not enjoyed by most businesses incorporated under state law.6"
This has encouraged the states to put pressure on an already eager Congress
to draft legislation subjecting tribal gaming operations to more federal taxes.
This state/tribe conflict over gaming first came to the Supreme Court in 1987
in Californiav. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.6

5 1. Paul Brietzke, The Law and Economics of Native American Casinos, 78 NEB. L. REV.
263 (1999).
52. NIGC, supra note 6.
53. Chen & LeDuff, supra note 7, at A21.
54. Rand & Light, supra note 22, at 404.
55. See Dirk Johnson, Economic Pulse:Indian Country; EconomicsCome to Life on Indian
Reservations, N.Y. TIMEs, July 3, 1994, at Al.
56. Rand & Light, supra note 22, at 404.

57. Id. at 402.
58. Chen & LeDuff, supra note 7, at A2 1.

59. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
60. Taylor, supra note 5, at 253.

61. Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202.
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A. Californiav. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians6 2
In Cabazon, the State of California attempted to prohibit certain types of
gaming on the Cabazon Band reservation.63 Because California is a Public
Law 280 state, its criminal laws extend to Indians in Indian country. Its
regulatory and legislative authority, however, do not.64 The issue before the
Court was whether California's law prohibiting certain types of gaming
operations in the state were "criminal/prohibitory" or "civil/regulatory" in
nature.65 The Court reasoned that because California permits a substantial
amount of gaming, and even promotes gambling through its state run lottery,
its attempt to regulate gaming on the Cabazon Band reservation was
civil/regulatory in nature, and therefore not permissible.6 6
B. Indian GamingRegulatory Act
The Cabazon decision increased the intense pressure on Congress to draft
legislation regulating Indian gaming. Responding to this pressure, in 1988
Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).67 This statute
provides that: "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming
activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by
Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as
a matter of
68
criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity.
The IGRA divides Indian gaming into three classes. Class I games include
"social games" for prizes with nominal value, and traditional tribal games.69
This class of gaming is subject solely to the jurisdiction of the Indian tribe.
Class II games include bingo, instant bingo, lotto, punch boards, tip jars, pulltabs, and other bingo-like games. These games are fully subject to the laws
and regulations of the state governing hours of operation, in addition to wager

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Public Law 280, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000). Public Law 280 originally transferred to
five willing states and offered all others, civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians
regardless of the Indians' preference for continued autonomy. GETCHES, supranote 20, at 489.
65. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202. California law prohibited bingo games unless conducted
by charitable organizations awarding pots limited to $250. Id. at 205.
66. Id. at211.
67. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (2000).
68. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) (2000).
69. GElCI-iEs, supra note 20, at 749.
70. Id.
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and pot size limitations. However, the remaining regulation of Class II games
is conducted jointly by the Indian tribes and the National Indian Gaming
Commission. 7 ' Class III games include all games not included in either Class
I or II, such as card games played against the house, and electronic facsimiles
of these games.72 Class III games may be conducted or licensed and regulated
by a tribe "in a State that permits such gaming," subject to an allocation of
regulatory authority between the state and the tribe set forth in a tribal-state
compact."
4
II. Chickasaw Nation v. United States

Despite Congress's fairly complex and exhaustive attempt, the IGRA did
not resolve all questions regarding the regulation of tribal gaming. Many of
these unresolved issues arise in the area of the federal taxation of Indian
gaming activities. One such question concerns the application of I.R.C. §§
4401(a)(1) and 4411 to pull-tab gaming activities conducted by the tribes.
I.R.C. § 4401 imposes an excise tax on all wagers," and I.R.C. § 4411

71. Id. The IGRA established the National Indian Gaming Commission, which is within
the Department ofthe Interior. It has broad regulatory and investigative authority to assure that
Indian gaming is not influenced by organized crime. It is funded by an assessment on Indian
Class If gaming enterprises. The assessment cannot exceed five percent of the gross revenues
in excess of $1,500,000. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
75. I.R.C. § 4401 provides:
(a) Wagers
(1) State authorized wagers - There shall be imposed on any wager
authorized under the law of the State in which accepted an excise tax equal to 0.25
percent of the amount of such wager.
(b) Amount of wager - In determining the amount of any wager for the
purposes of this subchapter, all charges incident to placing of such wager shall be
included; except that if the taxpayer establishes, in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Secretary, that an amount equal to the tax imposed by this
subchapter has been collected as a separate charge from the person placing such
wager, the amount so collected shall be excluded.
(c) Persons liable for tax - Each person who is engaged in the business of
accepting wagers shall be liable for and shall pay the tax under this subchapter on
all wagers placed with him. Each person who conducts any wagering pool or
lottery shall be liable for and shall pay the tax under this subchapter on all wagers
placed in such pool or lottery. Any person required to register under section 4412
who receives wagers for or on behalf of another person without having registered
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imposes a related occupational tax.76 In April 2000 the, Tenth Circuit
addressed this question in ChickasawNation v. UnitedStates, on appeal from
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma."
A. ChickasawNation v. UnitedStates, 208 F.3d871 (10th Cir. 2000)
The Chickasaw Nation is a Tribe with its principal place of business in
Ada, Oklahoma.78
[T]he Nation operates a number of for-profit business activities
within the State of Oklahoma, including gaming centers, tobacco
shops, convenience stores, gas stations, a motel, a restaurant, an
accounting firm, a radio station, an internet service provider, and
a computer store. All of these businesses are open to and utilized
by members of the Nation and the general public.79
The Nation also sells "pull-tabs" at a variety of locations. 8" Similar to the
more popular state "scratch-off' lottery tickets, each pull-tab is a two inch by
four inch card or ticket containing five windows covered with tabs. 8' A player
wins when her ticket reveals a certain pattern of symbols after she removes the
covered tabs. "Each pull-tab typically costs between 25 cents and one dollar,
and typically allows players to win between 25 cents and $2500," and the
award can be redeemed at the point of sale.82

under section 4412 the name and place of residence of such other person shall be
liable for and shall pay the tax under this subchapter on all such wagers received
by him.
I.R.C. § 4401.
76. I.R.C. § 4411 states:
(a) In general - There shall be imposed a special tax of $500 per year to be
paid by each person who is liable for the tax imposed under section 4401 ...
(b) Authorized persons - Subsection (a) shall be applied by substituting
"$50" for "$500" in the case of(1) any person whose liability for tax under section 4401 is determined only
under paragraph (1) of section 4401(a), and
(2) any person who is engaged in receiving wagers only for or on behalf of
persons described in paragraph (1).
I.R.C. § 4411.
77. 208 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 2000).

78. Id. at 873.
79. Id. at 873-74.
80. Id. at 874.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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.

not pay

federal wagering excise taxes or federal occupational taxes in connection with
its pull-tab sales."83 After the IRS conducted an audit in 1994, it determined

that the Nation was subject to the taxes in question. The Nation paid the taxes
for July 1993 and subsequently filed a claim for a refund. The government
filed a counterclaim for the unpaid portion of the taxes and interest assessed

on this amount for the period. 4
The Chickasaw Nation appealed the entry of summaryjudgment for the IRS
by the district court on four grounds:
(1) pull-tabs do not involve a taxable wager, as defined in [I.R.C.]
§ 4421, (2) it is not a "person" subject to federal waging excise
taxes, (3) the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act demonstrates

Congress' intent not to subject Indian gaming activities to federal
wagering excise taxes, and (4) the self-government guarantee of
the 1855 treaty between the United States and the Nation precludes
imposition of the taxes in question.8"
After reciting I.R.C. §4421 and its definition of "wager," the Tenth Circuit
held that it could not determine whether pull-tab gaming constitutes a
"lottery" for the purposes of the I.R.C. by viewing each individual purchase
of a pull-tab ticket unto itself. The court reasoned however, that because the
Nation purchases the tickets in bulk and the winning tickets are randomly
distributed throughout a 24,000 ticket series, "when a player purchases a
ticket, he is competing against all other persons who purchase tickets from
that same series."" Consequently, the court ruled that, when viewed on the
whole, the purchase of a pull-tab ticket constitutes a "lottery" and therefore
is a "wager" for the purpose of I.R.C. § 44010
Next, the court addressed the question of whether the Nation was a
"person" for purposes of the federal taxes at issue. The court first looked to
the definition of "person" under I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) because the term is not
defined in either I.R.C. §§ 4401 or 4411. Section 7701 (a)(]) states that"[t]he
term 'person' shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust,
estate, partnership, association, company, or corporation.""8 Using this

83. id.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 877.
Id.
I.R.C. § 770 1(a)(1) (2000).
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expansive definition of the term "person," the court concluded that Indian
tribes are "persons" for the purposes of I.R.C. §§ 4401 and 4411. The court
reasoned that to decide that Indian tribes did not fit the I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1)
definition of "person" would "essentially exempt tribes and tribal
organizations from many forms of federal tax liability and render entire
'
sections of the I.R.C. superfluous." 89
The court then moved to the question of whether the IGRA indicates
congressional intent not to impose federal wagering excise taxes or federal
occupational taxes on Indian gaming activities. After reciting the purpose of
the IGRA, 9° the court held that "[tihe clear and unambiguous language of [the
IGRA] contradicts the Nation's assertion that Congress' sole intent in enacting
the IGRA was to 'maximize tribal gaming revenues."' 9 1 While the court
conceded that Congress was interested in promoting tribal economic
development and self-sufficiency, "the statute's statement of purpose does
not... demonstrate any type of Congressional intent to place tribal gaming
revenues beyond the reach of federal wagering excise or federal occupational
taxes." 92
The court next addressed the tribe's assertion that "the IGRA expressly
prohibits the imposition of federal wagering excise taxes on Indian tribal
organizations engaged in gaming activities."93 The Nation contended that 25
U.S.C. § 2719(d), the subsection entitled "Application of Internal Revenue
Code of 1986," "demonstrates Congress' intent to apply only a limited number
of I.R.C. provisions" to Indian gaming operations.94 The court answered the
Nation's assertion by looking to the historical backdrop of the IGRA. The
court's historical examination focused primarily on the language of the Indian
Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982. 9' While the court noted that the
original language of the bill that became the IGRA96 "included an explicit
exemption for Indian gaming from [the] federal [wagering] excise tax,.. . that

89. Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 879.

90. The purpose of the statute as stated in 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2).
91. ChickasawNation, 208 F.3d at 881.
92. Id.

93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 882. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d) specifically mentions only a limited number of
i.R.C. provisions (I.R.C. §§ 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 60501, and chapter 35 ofthe Code). The
Nation argued that only those provisions mentioned apply to Indian gaming, and not those
provisions of the Code that impose tax liability.
95. I.R.C. § 7871 (2000).
96. S. 555, 100th Cong. § 37 (1987).
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exemption was deleted prior to passage."97 The court gave little weight to a
letter sent by Senator Daniel Inouye, one of the authors of the IGRA, to the
Commissioner of the IRS, which suggested "that by specifically referring to
Chapter 35 in § 2719(d), 'it was the intention of Congress that the tax
treatment of wagers conducted by Tribal governments be the same as that for
wagers conducted by state governments under Chapter 35 of the Internal
Revenue Code'.'9 The court stated that "[i]n light of this history, we believe
it is to assume.., that Congress intended," by way of negative inference from
§ 2719(d), to exempt Indian tribes from the federal wagering excise taxes. 99
Finally, the court addressed whether the 1855 treaty precluded imposition
of federal wagering excise taxes on the Nation. In deciding this question, the
court first determined the standard of review that it should use to analyze the
treaty language. The court cited the standard of review used by both the Third
and Eighth Circuits, which is whether a treaty "contains language which can
reasonably be construed to confer [tax] exemptions."" Using this test, the
court concluded that the language of the treaty... could not be "reasonably
construed to give rise to an exemption from any federal excise taxes." ' 2

97.' Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 882-83 (quoting Little Six, Inc. v. United States, 43
Fed. Cl. 80, 83 (Fed. Cl. 1999)).
98. Id. at 883.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 884 (quoting Lazore v. Commissioner, II F.3d I 180, 1185 (3d Cir. 1993), in turn
quoting Holt v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 38, 40 (8th Cir. 1966)).
101. The Nation pointed to Article VII of the 1855 Treaty which states that,
So far as may be compatible with the Constitution of the United States and the
laws made in pursuance thereof, regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian
tribes, the Choctaws and Chickasaws shall be secured in the unrestricted right of
self-government, and full jurisdiction, over persons and property, within their
respective limits; excepting, however, all persons, with their property, who are not
by birth, adoption or otherwise citizens or members of either the Choctaw or
Chickasaw Tribe, and all persons, not being citizens or members of either Tribe,
found within their limits, shall be considered intruders and be removed from, and
kept out of the same, by the United States agent, assisted if necessary by the
military, with the following exceptions, viz.: Such individuals as are now, or may
be in the employment of the Government, and their families; those peacefully
traveling or temporarily sojourning in the country of trading therein, under license
from the proper authority of the United States, and such as may be permitted by
the Choctaws or Chickasaws, with the assent of the United States agent, to reside
within their limits, without becoming citizens or members of either said Tribes.
Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 884.
102. Id.
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Having addressed the four arguments presented by the Chickasaw Nation,
the court ruled that the district court was correct in ruling in favor of the
government and, consequently, the tribe was liable for the wagering taxes
imposed by I.R.C. § 4401 and the occupational taxes imposed under I.R.C. §
4411.
B. Little Six, Inc. v. United States, 210 F.3d 1361 (Fed Cir. 2000)
Just nineteen days after the Tenth Circuit issued its opinion in Chickasaw
Nation, the Federal Circuit addressed the question of whether I.R.C. §§ 4401
and 4411 apply to Indian gaming operations in Little Six, Inc. v. United
States."3 The facts of this case were very similar to those of Chickasaw
Nation. The Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) operate gaming
activities on tribal lands in the state of Minnesota through its wholly owned
corporation, Little Six, Inc.'0 4 Included in these gaming operations are the sale
of "pull-tab" games." 5 The case came before the Federal Circuit after the
United States Court of Federal Claims denied the tribe's claim for a refund of
federal excise taxes and related occupational taxes paid on the wagers placed
on the "pull-tab" games operated on the reservation.
In Little Six, the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux argued that the wagering
excise tax imposed by I.R.C. § 4401 and the related occupational tax imposed
under I.R.C. § 4411 did not apply to wagers on pull-tab games because they
were not "state authorized."'" 6 The tribe also contended that 25 U.S.C. §
2719(d)(1) (a provision in the IGRA) exempts Indian tribes from the taxes at
7
issue.

The court first concluded that the wagers placed on these pull-tab games
were "state authorized," and therefore subject to taxation under §§ 4401 and
4411 .' It reasoned that the IGRA authorizes the tribe to operate "class II
gaming" activities (including pull-tabs) provided that "such Indian gaming is
located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person,
organization or entity." 9 Because Minnesota permits nonprofit organizations
to conduct pull-tab games, and the sale of pull-tabs is therefore authorized by

103. 210 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
104. Id. at 1362.

105. These "pull-tab" games are similar in every material respect to those at issue in
Chickasaw Nation.
106. Little Six, 210 F.3d at 1363.
107. Id.
108, Id.

109. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(l)(A) (2000).
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federal law under the IGRA, the court concluded that the "wagers placed on
those games are 'state authorized' for the purpose of assessing taxes under §§
4401 and 4411 of the Internal Revenue Code."'" 1°
The court then turned to the tribe's contention that it was exempt from
excise and occupational taxes in the same manner as state gaming."' The
tribe argued for this exemption on two related grounds. First, it contended
that because state-conducted lotteries are exempt under I.R.C. § 4402(3) from
the taxes imposed by I.R.C. §§ 4401 and 4411, under 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1),
tribes should be as well. Second, the tribe argued that, to the extent 25 U.S.C.
§ 2719(d)(1) is unclear, the Indian canon of construction requires any
ambiguity in the statute to be resolved in favor of the Indians." 2
The court agreed that the tribe was exempt from the taxes in question under
25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1). It grounded this holding on the language of I.R.C. §
2719(d)(1) which states (in relevant part) that:
The provisions of Title 26 (including sections 1441,3402(q), 604 1,
and 60501, and chapter 35 of such title) concerning the reporting
and withholding oftaxes with respect to the winnings from gaming
or wagering operations shall apply to Indian gaming operations
conducted pursuant to this chapter ...in the same manner as such
provisions apply to State gaming and wagering operations.' 13
The court interpreted this, by its parenthetical reference to chapter 35, to mean
that chapter 35 of the Internal Revenue Service Code applies to Indian gaming
in the same manner as it does to state gaming." 4 As a result, § 4402(3), which
is found in chapter 35 of the I.R.C., applies to the tribe and provides an
express tax exemption for "any wager placed in a sweepstakes, wagering pool,
or lottery which is conducted by an agency of a State acting under authority
of State law.""' 5 Accordingly, the court held that, "section 2719(d)(1) can
reasonably be construed as providing a tax exemption for wagers placed on
lotteries and pull-tab games conducted by Indian tribes, because chapter 35 of
the Internal Revenue Code provides such an exemption to state gaming
operations."" 6

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Little Six, 210 F.3d at 1364.
Id.
Id. at 1365.
25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(I) (2000).
Little Six, 210 F.3d at 1365.
I.R.C. § 4402(3) (2000).
Little Six,210 F.3d at 1365.
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In response to the government's argument that § 2719(d)(1 ) only applies to
those tax provisions that concern "the reporting and withholding oftaxes with
respect to the winnings,"" 7 the court relied on the canon of construction
demanding that when construing a statute it "must give effect and meaning to
all of its terms if possible.""..
The court rejected the government's
interpretation of the statute because it "would render language in the statute
superfluous.
The court further explained its decision by noting "the inconsistency
between the statute's reference to 'winnings,' and its reference to [I.R.C.] §
60501 and Chapter 35 of the I.R.C.," rendered the language in § 2719(d)(i)
ambiguous.'2 ° Citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, the court wrote
that "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with
ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit."'' The court went on to
imply that the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Chickasaw Nation v. United
States,2 was incorrect because the court failed to "discuss the Indian canon
of construction. "123
The Federal Circuit expanded on its decision by refuting the government's
argument that tax exemptions must be clearly expressed by statute. 24 The
court again cited the Supreme Court in Montana, stating that "although tax
exemptions generally are to be construed narrowly, in 'the Government's
dealings with the Indians the rule is exactly the contrary. The construction,
instead of being strict, is liberal." 1 25 The court stated that its conclusion was
further supported by the legislative history of the IGRA, which had the
promotion of tribal economic development and self-sufficiency as one of its
primary purposes. 126 "Equal treatment of tribes and states with respect to
exemptions from federal wagering taxes is consistent with this legislative
27
intent, and is in accord with the concept of co-equal sovereignty."'1

117. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1) (2000).
118. Little Six, 210 F.3d at 1365 (applying rule used by the Supreme Court in Baily v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 471 U.S. 759, 766(1985).
122. 208 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 2000).
123. Little Six, 210 F.3d at 1365.
124. Id.
125. Montana, 471 U.S. at 766 n.4 (quoting Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912)).
126. Little Six, 210 F.3d at 1366.
127. Id.
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28
C. Chickasaw Nation v. United States1

Following the Federal Circuit Court's ruling in Little Six, and recognizing
the conflict between the Circuits it created, the Supreme Court accepted
Chickasaw Nation on a writ of certiorari from the Tenth Circuit. Realizing
that the Supreme Court would likely dismiss its previous arguments as the
Tenth Circuit did, the Chickasaw Nation modified its case to be more in-line
with the decision of the Federal Circuit in Little Six. However, despite the
stronger argument, the Court ruled in a seven to two opinion that the tribe was
not exempt from the taxes imposed under I.R.C. §§ 4401 and 441 L129
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, began Part I of his opinion by reciting
25 U.S.C. 2719(d)(1) 3 ° In particular, he isolated the conflicting language
within the statute, finding that the language "concerning the reporting and
withholding of taxes" '' was inconsistent with the statute's parenthetical
reference to chapter 35, which "imposes [excise and occupational taxes related
to gambling] from which it -exempts certain state-controlled gambling
activities."' 132 He then conceded that rejecting the Tribe's "argument reduces
the phrase 'including chapter 35' to surplusage.""' However, he wrote that
."we can find no other reasonable reading of the statute."' 34
Breyer explained his conclusion by assessing the role of the parenthetical
in the statute, writing "the more plausible role for the parenthetical to play in
this subsection is that of providing an illustrative list of examples. So
considered, chapter 35 is simply a bad example "an example that Congress
included inadvertently.""'
He supported this position by reviewing the
original Senate bill, 36 which became the IGRA. It included the language "the
taxationandthe reporting and withholding of taxes." '37 "With the 'taxation'
language present, it would have made sense to include chapter 35, which
concerns taxation, in a parenthetical ... .
Yet, the phrase "the taxation
and" was removed prior to the time of the enactment of the IGRA for an
".

128. 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 86-87.
131. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d) (1) (2000).
132. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001); see I.R.C. § 4402(3)
(exempting state-operated gambling operations, such as lotteries, from the tax).
133. Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 89.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 90.
136. S.555, 100th Cong. § 37 (1997).
137. Id.
138. Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 91.
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unknown reason, while the reference to chapter 35 in the parenthetical
remained. Justice Breyer explained that
[i]t is far easier to believe that the drafters, having included the
entire parenthetical while the word 'taxation' was still part of the
bill, unintentionally failed to remove what had become a
superfluous numerical cross-reference particularly since the taxknowledgeable Senate Finance 39Committee never received the
opportunity to examine the bill. 1
Justice Breyer then proceeded to address the Indian canon of construction
and another canon, which requires a court to, if possible, give effect to every
word of a statute.140 First, the Court countered the second canon with another
canon, stating that "[t]he canon requiring a court to give effect to each word
'ifpossible' is sometimes offset by the canon that permits a court to reject
words 'as surplusage' if 'inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of
the statute . . . . ,,,4 Then, Justice Breyer moved on to the Indian canon of
construction, and immediately countered it with what he believes to be an
offsetting canon, the canon "that warns us against interpreting federal statutes
as providing tax exemptions unless those exemptions are clearly expressed."4 2
Justice Breyer concluded the majority opinion by stating that "the canons here
cannot make the difference for which the Tribes argue," because "the Court's
earlier cases are too individualized,. . .to warrant any such assessment about
the two canons' relative strength."' 43
Despite the fact that Justice Breyer did a more thorough job than either of
the Circuits of illuminating the contradictions in the statute, his conclusion
was less logical than that of the Federal Circuit in Little Six. First, his opinion
did not point to any conclusive evidence that would indicate Congress
intended to subject tribes to the taxes imposed under I.R.C. §§ 4401 and 4411.
It is just as plausible that Congress intended to exclude the language of the
statute which reads "concerning the reporting and withholding oftaxes,"' 144 as
it is that Congress meant to delete "chapter 35" from the parenthetical of the
statute. Obviously, the drafters made some kind of error when drafting the

139. Id.
140. Id. at 95. The Federal Circuit used this other canon to refute the government's argument. Here, Justice Breyer used it to refute the tribe's argument.
141. Id. at 94.
142. Id. at 95.
143. Id.
144. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d) (1) (2000).
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statute but, as O'Connor wrote in the dissenting opinion, "I agree with the
Court that §2719(d) incorporates an error in drafting. I disagree however, that
the section's reference to chapter 35 is necessarily that error."' " The majority
"can do no more than speculate that the bill's drafters included the
parenthetical while the original restriction was in place and failed to remove
it when that restriction was altered."146 Admittedly, both the Court's
interpretation of the statute, and the interpretation of the Chickasaw Nation
requires a rewriting of the statute, but "[n]either of these rewritings is
necessarily more 'serious' than the other."' 47
In fact, the Court's
interpretation "goes beyond treating statutory language as mere surplusage ...
[it] negates language that undeniably bears separate meaning."' 4 8 The
Nation's interpretation, on the other hand, simply dismisses "the reporting and
withholding of taxes"' 49 as surplus language.
Second, the majority's opinion failed to give sufficient weight to the power
of the Indian canon of construction. It is unclear whether the case would have
come out differently had the Court given the Indian canon of construction its
due, especially considering that Justice Breyer wrote, "[t]he language of the
statute is too strong to bend as the Tribes would wish."'' 0 Nevertheless, the
majority found enough confusion in the statutory language to at least address,
and attempt to refute, the Nation's argument.
The Court's primary attempt to rebut the Nation's argument that the Indian
canon of construction should control and tip the statutory scales in favor of the
Nation concerned a conflicting canon of interpretation. This canon requires
federal statutes containing tax exemptions to be interpreted strictly unless
those exemptions are clearly expressed. Although this too is an important
canon of construction, as the dissent pointed out, "[the] Court has repeatedly
held that, when these two canons conflict, the Indian canon predominates.''
Justice O'Connor went on to state that in past cases the "Court has failed to
apply the Indian canon to extend tax exemptions to the Nations only when
nothing in the language of the underlying statute or treaty suggests the Nations

145. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 97.
147. Id. at 98.
148. Id. at 97-98.
149. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d) (1) (2000).
150. Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 89.
151. Id. at 100-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 674-75
(1912); Squire v. Capoenan, 35 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n.,
411 U.S. 164, 176 (1973); and Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S.
172, 194 n.5 (1999)).
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should be exempted."' 52 In this case, given the statute's reference to chapter
35, it is at least possible that Congress intended to exempt tribes from these
taxes.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Chickasaw Nation v. United States 3
could cost the Indian gaming industry over $25 million annually.'54 This
seems contrary to the legislative intent of the IGRA, which was to provide "a
statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments."'" While many successful gaming tribes will have little
problem paying the taxes imposed by I.R.C. §§ 4401 and 4411, other tribes
like the Chickasaw Nation have not been as successful with their gaming
operations. Any additional tax imposed by the federal government will reduce
the Nation's prospects of ever achieving self-sufficiency. It will noticeably
decrease the tribal resources necessary to continue to provide services for its
people given that "all the Chickasaw's gambling proceeds go toward such
projects as funding the tribal government, spurring regional economic growth,
running alcohol treatment programs and providing education and social
services for the tribe," and the tribe has few other viable sources of revenue. 56
The government's victory in this case could also reverse another trend that
began with the rise of the Indian gaming industry - less gaming revenue
could mean fewerjobs for reservation Indians. In the Mille Lacs Band alone,
unemployment went from forty-five percent to zero in two years after the tribe
began its gaming operations.'" A rise in unemployment could negatively
affect the sense of "can-doism" fostered by gaming on reservations."'
However, beyond the potential drastic effects the application of I.R.C. §§
4401 and 4411 could have on some Indian tribes, this Supreme Court ruling
could also mean the death of the Indian canon of construction. The canon's

152. Jd. at 101.
153. 534 U.S. 84(2001).
154. Twenty-five percent of$ 10,000,000,000 under I.R.C. § 4401(a) (2000), plus $50 under
I.R.C. § 4411 (b) (2000). See supra note 8.
155. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000).
156. Tom McCann, Chickasaw Nation v. US., ON THE DOCKET (Northwestern Univ.), at
http://joumalism.medill.northwestern.edu/docket/cases.srch (link to "Chickasaw Nation v.
U.S.").
157. Rand & Light, supra note 22, at 403.
158. Id. at 402.
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death has much more serious implications, and potentially affects all tribes
regardless of any involvement in gaming. The Indian canon of construction
has been an overriding doctrine in Indian law for about 200 years.'
Prior to
Chickasaw Nation, 6 ' the Court applied the canon whenever it determined
treaty or statutory language to be ambiguous.' 6'
The canon was originally created to account for the language difference
between the tribes and the non-Indian, English-speaking drafters of treaties
and legislation, and is "rooted in the unique trust relationship between the
United States and the Indians."' 62 A shift in policy would put not only that
trust relationship in jeopardy, but would also leave all Indian tribes, gaming
and nongaming, without one of the doctrines on which they have based both
their social and business activities for over two centuries. Yet, given the
changing attitude in Indian jurisprudence,' 63 this decision may indicate that is
exactly where the Court is headed.' 6 4 Even if this decision against the
Chickasaw Nation has not officially put an end to the Indian canon of
construction, it has likely removed the canon's teeth. Considering the murky
language of 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1), it is difficult to imagine many statutes
being less lucid. If the Court believes that the canon is not strong enough to
apply here, it is hard to envision the Court applying it to any statute in the
future. Regardless ofthe canon's remaining strength or the Court's perception
thereof, one thing is for certain, this ruling contributes to the confusion that
has haunted Federal Indian law since the Marshall Trilogy and has Indians
unsure of where Federal Indian policy is headed.

159. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912) ("This rule of construction has been
recognized, without exception, for more than a hundred years and has been applied in tax
cases.").
160. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001).
161. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); McClanahan v.
Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 41 ]U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S.
423, 431-32 (1943); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); Carpenter v. Shaw,
280 U.S. 363,367 (1930); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665,675 (1912); Winters v. United States
207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
162. Montana, 471 U.S. at 766 (citing Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226, 247 (1985)).
163. See generally Ben Welch, A Slippery Slope, The U.S. Supreme Court Has Become a
PrecariousSite for FightingSovereignty Battles, AM. INDIAN REP., Oct. 2001, at 12.
164. Douglas W. Chase, The IndianGaming RegulatoryAct andState Income Taxation of
Indian Casinos: Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson and County of Yakima v. Yakima
Indian Nation, 49 TAX L. 275 (1995) (citing recent case law and legislative activity
demonstrating that taxation of Native American casinos may be a viable option for both state
and federal legislatures); see also Welch, supra note 163.
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